I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Inalienable rights are not rights that require consent to be alienated; inalienable rights are rights that may not be alienated even with consent. If a consensual contract to alienate a certain right was for some reason inherently invalid, then the right would be inalienable. The topic of inalienable rights is bound up with contractarian theories of justice, where we might take John Rawls as a modern representative, and with (classical) liberal theories of justice, where we might take Robert Nozick as a representative (at least on the libertarian end of the spectrum). My focus is on the common foundation of consent and contracts that is shared by contractarian and liberal theories of justice.
Since liberalism and contractarianism both put an emphasis on contracts, it should be a matter of some importance to know if there are some contracts that ought to be considered inherently invalid and thus certain rights which are inalienable.
The paradigm individual example to consider is a contract to sell oneself into slavery, the self-sale contract. The paradigm political example is a social contract of subjection, a pactum subjectionis which transferred and alienated the right of self-government to a (Hobbesian) sovereign. The paradigm domestic example is the old coverture marriage contract wherein the wife suspended her independent legal personality (feme sole) in favor of being a feme covert whose legal personality was subsumed under the legal person of her Ôlord and baronÕ.
Robert Nozick was one of the few modern philosophers to explicitly consider the first two examples and to treat them within his theory. Controversially, he pointed out that the libertarian philosophy would accept both these contracts as being valid or legally permitted. He argued that a free libertarian society should validate the political alienation contract with a Ôdominant protective associationÕ 1 playing the role of the sovereign. And the same reasoning would re-validate 2 the individual version of the alienation contract:
The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would. 3 Regardless of whether or not this was NozickÕs considered personal judgment in Ôreflective equilibriumÕ, he did a service to philosophy by grinding out the logic of the liberal-contractar-1 Nozick (1974) . 2 It would be Ôre-validateÕ since in the decade before the Civil War, six states had explicit laws Ôto permit a free Negro to become a slave voluntarilyÕ (Gray 1958, p. 527) . For instance in Louisiana, legislation was passed in 1859 Ôwhich would enable free persons of color to voluntarily select masters and become slaves for lifeÕ (Sterkx 1972, p. 149) . 3 Nozick, Anarchy, p. 331.
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ian vision unconstrained by any inalienable rights theory. 4 Few, if any, other philosophers would personally agree that these contracts should be allowed, but there is a distinct lack of theory which yields that result.
5
A third paradigm example of a personal alienation contract is the old coverture marriage contract, wherein the wife contractually alienated her independent legal personality to become a sort of subperson or dependent under the ÔcoverÕ of the husband. Like the self-sale contract and political pact of subjection, the coverture marriage contract is now outlawed in modern democratic societies. But with a few exceptions, notably the work of Carole Pateman, there is little theory in the modern literature as to why such a contract (perhaps in a non-gendered form) should be considered inherently invalid.
The modern inattention to a theory of inalienability is naturally matched by a comparable neglect of the consent-based contractarian arguments made historically for slavery and for autocratic governments. Of course, there were those who defended slavery or autocracy on racial, patriarchal, or religious grounds (ÔDivine RightÕ), and liberal intellectual history tends to dote on such arguments as the only alternatives. But our focus is on the sophisticated or ÔbestÕ contractual arguments for the permissibility of slavery or autocracy even within the natural rights tradition which considered such rights as alienable. In response to those historical arguments in the alienable natural rights tradition, the democratic and anti-slavery movements developed a 4 Sometimes Ôinalienable rightsÕ are defined as rights which may not be taken away, say, by the government without consent, and Nozick, of course, emphasized such rights. But those are better termed (alienable) rights as opposed to some privileges that were granted and may be rescinded by the government. Nozick had no notion of inalienable rights in the usual sense of not being alienable even with consent. 5 The authorÕs pseudonymous spoof of Nozick-Philmore (1982;  reprinted with explanation in Ellerman 1995)-shows the flaws in the rather superficial arguments against the self-enslavement contract given by the few liberal authors who explicitly consider it. The point of the spoof was to encourage the retrieval of the deeper inalienability theory developed historically to defeat apologies for slavery based on implicit or explicit contracts-a retrieval that was in fact carried out in Pateman (1988) . theory of inalienability which descends from the Reformation and Enlightenment (with some anticipation by the Stoics).
Hence, our task is largely retrieval. First, the consent-based contractarian arguments for autocracy and slavery need to be reviewed, and then the theory of inalienability that descends from the Reformation and Enlightenment needs to be recovered in a modern form. When that theory is reassembled, it becomes clear that the modern self-rental contract, 6 i.e., the employment contract, would also be ruled out by the theory. This rather controversial result then provides a basis to re-evaluate modern liberalcontractarian philosophy such as the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. For instance, Rawls lived his whole life in an economy based on the renting (or, as it is usually called, hiring) of human beings, and yet in his writings about justice he never considered the possibility that there might be something inherently wrong with the contract to rent persons. Thus, if the inalienability argument that rules out the self-sale contract, the political pact of subjection, and the coverture marriage contract also rules out the employer-employee contract, then this would point to a major problem in RawlsÕ theory and indeed in modern liberal or contractarian philosophy as a whole.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY SLAVERY CONTRACTS
For liberalism, the most basic frame is the question of consent versus coercion. Often slavery is seen as being coercive Ôby definitionÕ so there is no need to consider a voluntary selfenslavement contract. But semantics aside, from ancient times there have been defenses of slavery on contractual grounds.
In the Institutes of Justinian, Roman law provided three legal ways to become a slave: Slaves either are born or become so. They are born so when their mother is a slave; they become so either by the law of nations, that is, by captivity, or by the civil law, as when a free person, above the age of twenty, suffers himself to be sold, that he may share the price given for him. 6 ÔSince slavery was abolished, human earning power is forbidden by law to be capitalized. A man is not even free to sell himself; he must rent himself at a wageÕ (Samuelson 1976, p. 52 And this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenants either in express words or by other sufficient signs of the will that, so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure…. It is not, therefore, the victory that gives the right of dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant.
9
Thus, all of the three legal means of becoming a slave in Roman law had explicit or implicit contractual interpretations. In addition to giving a contractual interpretation to the slavery of a child born of a slave mother, Pufendorf noted that an explicit slavery contract was a lifetime version of the master-servant contract (employment contract in modern terms) where a servant could be hired for a certain time and would receive wages:
But to such a Servant as voluntarily offers himself to perpetual Servitude, the Master is obliged to allow perpetual Maintenance, and all Necessaries for this Life; it being his Duty on the other hand to give his constant Labour in all Services whereto his Master shall command him, and whatsoever he shall gain thereby, he is to deliver to him. 10 8 Pufendorf (2003 Pufendorf ( [1673 . 9 Hobbes (1958 Hobbes ( [1651 ), Bk. II, Chap. 20. 10 Pufendorf, Whole Duty, p. 185.
John LockeÕs Two Treatises of Government is a classic of liberal thought. Locke would not condone a contract that gave the master the power of life or death over the slave:
For a Man, not having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases.
11
Locke is ruling out a voluntary version of the old Roman slavery, where the master could take the life of the slave with impunity. But once the contract was put on a more civilized footing, Locke saw no problem and nicely renamed it Ôdrudg-eryÕ:
For, if once Compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited Power on the one side, and Obedience on the other, the State of War and Slavery ceases, as long as the Compact endures…. I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other Nations, that Men did sell themselves; but, Ôtis plain, this was only to Drudgery, not to Slavery. For, it is evident, the Person sold was not under an Absolute, Arbitrary, Despotical Power.
12
Moreover, Locke agreed with Hobbes on the practice of enslaving the captives in a ÔJust WarÕ as a quid pro quo exchange based on the on-going consent of the captive:
Indeed having, by his fault, forfeited his own Life, by some Act that deserves Death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his Power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own Service, and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, Ôtis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he desires. 13 Locke seemed to have justified slavery in the Carolinas by interpreting the raids into Africa as just wars and the slaves as the captives.
14 William BlackstoneÕs codification of common law was quite important in the development of English and American jurisprudence. Like Locke, Blackstone rules out slavery where Ôan absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life Yet, with regard to any right which the master may have lawfully acquired to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as before: for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer term. 15 An interesting case study in the selectiveness of liberalcontractarian intellectual history is the treatment of the proslavery writers. The proslavery position is usually presented as being based on illiberal racist or paternalistic arguments. Considerable attention is lavished on illiberal paternalistic writers such as George Fitzhugh, 16 while consent-based contractarian defenders of slavery are passed over in silence. For example, Reverend Samuel Seabury gave a sophisticated liberal-contractarian defense of ante-bellum slavery in the Hobbes-Pufendorf tradition of alienable natural rights theory 17 :
From all which it appears that, wherever slavery exists as a settled condition or institution of society, the bond which unites master and servant is of a moral nature; founded in right, not in might;…. Let the origin of the relation have been what it may, yet when once it can plead such prescription of time as to have received a fixed and determinate character, it must be assumed to be founded in the consent of the parties, and to be, to all intents and purposes, a compact or covenant, of the same kind with that which lies at the foundation of all human society. 18 Seabury easily anticipated the retort to his classical tacitcontract argument:
''Contract!'' methinks I hear them exclaim; ''look at the poor fugitive from his masterÕs service! He bound by contract! A good joke, truly.'' But ask these same men what binds them to society? Are they slaves to their rulers? 15 Blackstone (1959 Blackstone ( [1765 , p. 72), section on Master and Servant. 16 See, for example, Genovese (1971); Wish (1960); or Fitzhugh [1960 or Fitzhugh [ (1857 ].
17 McKitrick (1963) collects essays of fifteen pro-slavery writers but does not include a single writer who argues to allow slavery on a contractual basis such as Seabury-not to mention Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Blackstone and a host of others.
18 Seabury (1969 Seabury ( [1861 , p. 144).
O no! They are bound together by the COMPACT on which society is founded. Very good; but did you ever sign this compact? Did your fathers every sign it? ''No; it is a tacit and implied contract. '' 19 If modern contractarian liberals had recognized the past contractarian arguments for slavery (and autocracy), then they might be in the uncomfortable position of disagreeing with those proslavery thinkers not in principle but only in matters of fact. They might be reduced to special pleas that the implied Ôsocial contractÕ has ÔgenuineÕ tacit consent, but that the implied slavery contract did not. It is no surprise that modern liberalcontractarian thinkers have just avoided this whole quandary by promulgating the consent-or-coercion framing of the slavery debates. The pro-slavery contractual arguments go down the memory hole; itÕs just a question of consent or coercion. And liberal-contractarian thinkers have taken a stand foursquare in favor of consent as opposed to coercion.
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY CONTRACTS OF SUBJECTION
It was previously noted that there were both individual and collective versions of the contract to alienate the rights of selfgovernance. The collective version was the pact of subjection, the pactum subjectionis, which alienated and transferred the peopleÕs rights of self-governance to a sovereign who then ruled in the sovereignÕs own name-not as a delegate, representative, or trustee of the people. By the contract of subjection, the people became subjects of the sovereign. Here again, the intellectual history of the debate between autocracy and democracy has been reframed as a question of coercion or consent. Democracy is presented as Ôgovernment based on consent of the governedÕ and non-democratic governments are presented as being based on coercion. 20 But there was a contractarian defense of non-democratic government from Antiquity down to HarvardÕs Nozick.
We may again start with Roman law. The sovereignty of the Roman emperor was usually seen as being founded on a contract of rulership enacted by the Roman people. The Roman jurist Ulpian gave the classic and oft-quoted statement of this view in the Institutes of Justinian:
Whatever has pleased the prince has the force of law, since the Roman people by the lex regia enacted concerning his imperium, have yielded up to him all their power and authority. 21 The American constitutional scholar, Edward S. Corwin, noted the questions that arose in the Middle Ages about the nature of this pact:
During the Middle Ages the question was much debated whether the lex regia effected an absolute alienation (translatio) of the legislative power to the Emperor, or was a revocable delegation (cessio). The champions of popular sovereignty at the end of this period, like Marsiglio of Padua in his Defensor Pacis, took the latter view.
22
It is precisely this question of translatio or concessio-alienation or delegation of the right of government in the contract-that is the key question, not consent versus coercion. Consent is on both sides of that alienation (translatio) versus delegation (concessio) framing of the question. The alienation version of the contract became a sophisticated tacit contract defense of non-democratic government wherever the latter existed as a settled condition. And the delegation version of the contract became the foundation for democratic theory.
The German legal thinker, Otto Gierke, was quite clear about the alienation-vs.-delegation question:
This dispute also reaches far back into the Middle Ages. It first took a strictly juristic form in the dispute… as to the legal nature of the ancient ''translatio imperii'' from the Roman people to the Princeps. One school explained this as a definitive and irrevocable alienation of power, the other as a mere concession of its use and exercise…. On the one hand from the peopleÕs abdication the most absolute sovereignty of the prince might be deduced,…. On the other hand the assumption of a mere ''concessio imperii'' led to the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
23
21 Institutes, Lib. I, Tit. II, 6; Quoted in Corwin (1955, p. 4) . 22 Corwin, Higher Law, p. 4, fn. 8. 23 Gierke (1966, pp. 93-94) .
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A state of government which had been settled for many years was ex post facto legitimated by the tacit consent of the people. Thomas Aquinas expressed the canonical medieval view:
Aquinas had laid it down in his Summary of Theology that, although the consent of the people is essential in order to establish a legitimate political society, the act of instituting a ruler always involves the citizens in alienating-rather than merely delegating-their original sovereign authority.
24
In about 1310, according to Gierke, ÔEngelbert of Volkersdorf is the first to declare in a general way that all regna et principatus originated in a pactum subjectionis which satisfied a natural want and instinctÕ. 25 After noting that an individual could sell himself into slavery under Hebrew and Roman law, Hugo Grotius extends the possibility to the political level.
In view of this history of apologetics for autocracy based on consent, the distinction between coercion and government based on the Ôconsent of the governedÕ was not the key to democratic theory. The real debate was within the sphere of consent and was between the alienation (translatio) and delegation (concessio) versions of the basic social or political constitution. Late medieval thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus of Saxoferrato laid some of the foundations for democratic theory in the distinction between consent that establishes a relation of delegation and trusteeship versus consent to an alienation of authority:
The theory of popular sovereignty developed by Marsiglio [Marsilius] and Bartolus was destined to play a major role in shaping the most radical version of early modern constitutionalism. Already they are prepared to argue that sovereignty lies with the people, that they only delegate and never alienate it, and thus that no legitimate ruler can ever enjoy a higher status than that of an official appointed by, and capable of being dismissed by, his own subjects.
28
As Marsilius put it:
The aforesaid whole body of citizens or the weightier part thereof is the legislator regardless of whether it makes the law directly by itself or entrusts the making of it to some person or persons, who are not and cannot be the legislator in the absolute sense, but only in a relative sense and for a particular time and in accordance with the authority of the primary legislator.
29
According to Bartolus, the citizens Ôconstitute their own princepsÕ so any authority held by their rulers and magistrates Ôis only delegated to them (concessum est) by the sovereign body of the peopleÕ. 30 To secure that distinction for democratic theory, the task was to develop arguments that there was something inherently invalid in the alienation or translatio contracts, and thus that the rights which these contracts pretended to alienate were in fact inalienable. We have seen that the debate about slavery and autocracy was not a simple consent-versus-coercion debate. From antiquity down to the present, there were consent-based arguments for slavery and non-democratic government as being founded on certain explicit or implicit contracts. Hence, in the counterarguments of the abolitionist and democratic movements, it was not enough to criticize divine rights or the coercion of people of another race who were considered of diminished capacity. The democratic and abolitionist movements needed to counter not the worst but the ÔbestÕ arguments for slavery and autocracy. They needed to counter the arguments that slavery and autocracy could be based on explicit or implicit contracts.
The key idea in the counterargument was that in consenting to such a personal alienation contract, a person is agreeing to, in effect, take on the legal role of a non-adult, indeed, a nonperson or thing. Yet all the consent in the world would not in fact turn an adult with capacity into a minor or person of diminished capacity, not to mention, turn a person into a thing. The most the person could do was to obey the master, sovereign, or employer-and the authorities would ÔcountÕ that as fulfilling the contract. Then all the legal rights and obligations would be assigned according to the ÔcontractÕ (as if the person in fact had diminished or no capacity). But the attributes that make one a person (e.g., de facto responsible action) cannot in fact be transferred to another person. Since the person remained a de facto fully capacitated adult person with only the contractual role of a non-person or diminished person, the contract was impossible and invalid. A system of positive law that accepted such contracts would only be a fraud on an institutional scale. That, in a nutshell, is the inalienable rights theory based on the de facto nontransferability (or factual inalienability) of the attributes a person has qua person.
The ÔproblemÕ with any theory (as opposed to a catalogue of personal views) is that it may have Ôlegs of its ownÕ and go further that the intended applications. The inalienability theory is a case in point since it applies as well to the self-rental contract-that is, todayÕs employment contract-as to the self-sale DAVID ELLERMAN 582 contract or pact of subjection. One can certainly voluntarily agree to a contract to be ÔemployedÕ by an ÔemployerÕ on a long or short term basis, but one cannot in fact ÔtransferÕ oneÕs own actions for the long or short term. The factual inalienability of responsible human action and decision-making is independent of the duration of the contract. That factual inalienability is also independent of the compensation paid in the contract-which is why this inalienability analysis has nothing to do with exploitation theories of either the Marxian or neoclassical (i.e., paying less than the value of marginal productivity) varieties.
Where the legal system ÔvalidatesÕ such contracts, it must fictitiously ÔcountÕ oneÕs inextricably co-responsible co-operation with the ÔemployerÕ as fulfilling the employment contract-unless, of course, the employer and employee commit a crime together. The servant in work then becomes the partner in crime:
All who participate in a crime with a guilty intent are liable to punishment. A master and servant who so participate in a crime are liable criminally, not because they are master and servant, but because they jointly carried out a criminal venture and are both criminous.
32
When the ÔventureÕ being Ôjointly carried outÕ by the employer and employee is not criminous, then the facts about human responsibility do not change. But then the fiction takes over. The joint venture or partnership is transformed into the employerÕs sole venture. The employee is legally transformed from being a co-responsible partner to being only an input supplier sharing no legal responsibility for either the costs or the outputs of the business.
V. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INALIENABILITY RIGHTS ARGUMENT
The foundation of the inalienable rights argument was the crucial difference between persons and things in an alienation contract. Where has this insight-that a person cannot in fact voluntarily alienate the attributes of being a person-erupted in the history of thought? The Ancients did not see this matter clearly. For Aristotle, slavery was based on ÔfactÕ; some adults were seen as being inherently of diminished capacity if not as Ôtalking instrumentsÕ marked for slavery Ôfrom the hour of their birthÕ. 33 Treating them as slaves was no more inappropriate for Aristotle than treating a donkey as an animal-to each according to its nature.
The Stoics held the radically different view that no one was a slave by their nature; slavery was an external condition juxtaposed to the internal freedom of the soul. Chrysippus challenged AristotleÕs notion that some people were slaves by nature. By virtue of their rational and social nature, Cicero saw all men as equal under the jus naturale. Sabine found in the Stoics an anticipation of the Kantian theme to treat all humans as persons rather than as things:
Even if he were a slave he would not be, as Aristotle had said, a living tool, but more nearly as Chrysippus had said, a wage-earner for life. Or, as Kant rephrased the old ideal eighteen centuries later, a man must be treated as an end and not as a means. The astonishing fact is that Chrysippus and Cicero are closer to Kant than they are to Aristotle. 34 Seneca developed the idea of external bondage and internal freedom of the soul:
It is a mistake to think that slavery penetrates the entire man. The better part of him is exempt. Bodies can be assigned to masters and be at their mercy. But the mind, at any rate, is its own master, …. The body, therefore, is what fortune hands over to a master, what he buys and sells. That inner part can never come into anyoneÕs possession. Whatever proceeds from it is free.
35
In spite of the legal role of the slave as an instrument employed by another person, the mind of the slave is sui juris.
The Stoic doctrine that the Ôinner part cannot be delivered into bondageÕ 36 re-emerged in the Reformation doctrine of liberty of conscience. Liberal thought tends to interpret the doctrine of liberty of conscience in terms of tolerance.
37 But 33 Aristotle, Politics, 1254a. 34 Sabine (1958, p. 165) . 35 Seneca (1995) , Book III, §20, p. 257. 36 Davis (1966, p. 77) . 37 For example, Rawls (1996) .
there is another aspect of the doctrine that leads to the theory of inalienable rights, and this aspect gets short shrift in liberal intellectual history. Secular authorities who try to compel belief can only secure external conformity:
Besides, the blind, wretched folk do not see how utterly hopeless and impossible a thing they are attempting. For no matter how much they fret and fume, they cannot do more than make people obey them by word or deed; the heart they cannot constrain, though they wear themselves out trying. For the proverb is true, ''Thoughts are free.'' Why then would they constrain people to believe from the heart, when they see that it is impossible? 38 Martin Luther was explicit about the de facto element; it was ÔimpossibleÕ to Ôconstrain people to believe from the heartÕ:
Furthermore, every man is responsible for his own faith, and he must see it for himself that he believes rightly. As little as another can go to hell or heaven for me, so little can he believe or disbelieve for me; and as little as he can open or shut heaven or hell for me, so little can he drive me to faith or unbelief. Since, then, belief or unbelief is a matter of every oneÕs conscience, and since this is no lessening of the secular power, the latter should be content and attend to its own affairs and permit men to believe one thing or another, as they are able and willing, and constrain no one by force.
39
Perhaps it was Benedict de Spinoza who first translated the doctrine of the liberty of conscience into the political notion of a right that could not be ceded Ôeven with consentÕ. In SpinozaÕs Theologico-Political Treatise, he spelled out the essentials of the inalienable rights argument:
However, we have shown already (Chapter XVII) that no manÕs mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these questions fall within a manÕs natural right, which he cannot abdicate even with consent. I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways, and to an almost incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it may be so dependent on another manÕs words, that it may fitly be said to be ruled by him; but although this 38 Luther (1942 Luther ( [1523 ). 39 Ibid., p. 316.
influence is carried to great lengths, it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement, that each manÕs understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates.
40
But it was Francis Hutcheson in the Scottish Enlightenment who arrived at the same idea in the form that was to later enter the political lexicon through the American Declaration of Independence. Although intimated in earlier works, the inalienability argument is best developed in HutchesonÕs influential A System of Moral Philosophy:
Our rights are either alienable, or unalienable. The former are known by these two characters jointly, that the translation of them to others can be made effectually, and that some interest of society, or individuals consistently with it, may frequently require such translations. Thus our right to our goods and labours is naturally alienable. But where either the translation cannot be made with any effect, or where no good in human life requires it, the right is unalienable, and cannot be justly claimed by any other but the person originally possessing it. 41 Hutcheson contrasts de facto alienable goods where Ôthe translation of them to others can be made effectuallyÕ (like a shovel) with factually inalienable faculties where Ôthe translation cannot be made with any effectÕ. This was not just some outpouring of moral emotions that one should not alienate this or that basic right. Hutcheson actually set forth a theory which could have legs of its own far beyond HutchesonÕs (not to mention LutherÕs) intent. He based the theory on what in fact could or could not be transferred or alienated from one person to another.
Hutcheson goes onto show how the Ôright of private judgmentÕ or liberty of conscience is inalienable:
Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable. 42 Hutcheson pinpoints the factual nontransferability of private decision-making power. In the case of the criminous employee, 40 Spinoza (1951 Spinoza ( [1670 , p. 257). 41 Hutcheson (1755, p. 261) . 42 Ibid., pp. 261-262.
we saw how the employee ultimately makes the decisions himself (through ratification and voluntary obedience) in spite of what is commanded by the employer. Short of coercion, an individualÕs faculty of judgment cannot in fact be short circuited by a secular or religious authority:
A like natural right every intelligent being has about his own opinions, speculative or practical, to judge according to the evidence that appears to him. This right appears from the very constitution of the rational mind which can assent or dissent solely according to the evidence presented, and naturally desires knowledge. The same considerations shew this right to be unalienable: it cannot be subjected to the will of another: thoÕ where there is a previous judgment formed concerning the superior wisdom of another, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, to a weak mind, may become sufficient evidence.
43
Democratic theory carried over this theory from the inalienability of conscience to a critique of the Hobbesian pactum subjectionis, the contract to alienate and transfer the right of self-determination as if it were a property that could be transferred from a people to a sovereign. Few have seen these connections as clearly as Staughton Lynd in his Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism. When commenting on HutchesonÕs theory, Lynd noted that when Ôrights were termed ÔunalienableÕ in this sense, it did not mean that they could not be transferred without consent, but that their nature made them untransferrableÕ. 44 The crucial link was to go from the inalienable liberty of conscience to a theory of inalienable rights:
Like the mindÕs quest for religious truth from which it was derived, selfdetermination was not a claim to ownership which might be both acquired and surrendered, but an inextricable aspect of the activity of being human.
45
Or as Ernst Cassirer put it:
There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to personality…They charged the great logician [Hobbes] with a contradiction 43 Ibid., p. 295. Note how Hutcheson even echoes Spinoza in affirming inalienability even though oneÕs judgment might seem to be ÔruledÕ by another.
44 Lynd (1969, p. 45 In the American Declaration of Independence, ÔJefferson took his division of rights into alienable and unalienable from Hutcheson, who made the distinction popular and importantÕ. 47 But the theory behind the notion of inalienable rights was lost in the transition from the Scottish Enlightenment to the slave-holding society of ante-bellum America. The phraseology of Ôinalienable rightsÕ is a staple in the American political culture, e.g., as Fourth of July rhetoric, but the original theory of inalienability has been largely ignored or forgotten.
VI. THE COVERTURE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PERSONAL ALIENATION CONTRACT
Another historical example of this sort of institutionalized fiction was the older and now legally invalid coverture marriage contract that ÔidentifiedÕ the legal personality of the wife with that of the husband:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-French, a feme covert, and is said to be under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
49
In the baron-femme relationship, a female was to pass from the cover of her father to the cover of her husband (with the present-day vestiges of the bride taking the husbandÕs family name instead of the fatherÕs, and the wedding ceremony where the brideÕs father Ôgives awayÕ the bride to the groom). A wife 46 Cassirer (1963, p. 175) . 47 Wills (1979, p. 213) . 48 See Ellerman (1992) , for more intellectual history of the inalienability argument.
49 Blackstone (1959 Blackstone ( [1765 , p. 83), section on Husband and Wife.
could own property and make contracts, but only in the name of her husband. Again, obedience counted as ÔfulfillingÕ the contract to have the wifeÕs legal personality subsumed under and identified with that of the husband.
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The coverture marriage contract was generally outlawed in the modern democracies during the latter part of the nineteenth century in favor of a partnership version of the marriage contract, but one could imagine a modernized gender-neutral dependency contract. One adult with full capacity would voluntarily agree to become a ÔdependentÕ of another adult, the ÔguardianÕ or ÔsponsorÕ, in return for whatever consideration. The independent and adult legal personality of the ÔdependentÕ would be ÔsuspendedÕ in favor of the guardian. The dependent could only make contracts and hold property under the name of the guardian. Obedience by the adult dependent to the guardian would count as ÔfulfillingÕ this contract and the legal rights would be allocated accordingly (e.g., all property belonging to the guardian).
The gender-specific aspect of the historical coverture contract was not the basic problem. The hypothetical modernized gender-neutral version of the coverture contract would be invalid for the same reasons as the original coverture contract, the selfsale contract, or the employment contract. The adult Ôdepen-dentÕ remains a de facto adult, the law would accept obedience to the guardian as ÔfulfillingÕ the contract, and then the legal rights would be assigned accordingly as if the ÔdependentÕ was actually a non-adult. 51 In spite of the abundance of legal precedent in the historical alienation contracts such as the self-sale contract, the pactum subjectionis, and the coverture marriage contract, todayÕs employment contract, and even some hypothetical alienation contracts (the Ôdependency contractÕ), legal theory has yet to focus on the general notion of an alienation contract applied to persons. All these personal alienation contracts have the same scheme. An adult person with full capacity voluntarily agrees for whatever reason and in return for whatever consideration to accepting a lesser legal role. But they do not in fact alienate their capacity as a person in order to fulfill that diminished legal role. Instead, the law accepts their (non-criminous) obedience to the master as ÔfulfillingÕ the contract. Then the rights and obligations follow the legal role (e.g., the slave of a master, the subject of a sovereign, the femme covert of her baron, the employee of the employer, and so forth)-as if the person were not in fact a person of full capacity. The whole scheme amounts to a fiction and fraud on an institutional scale that nonetheless parades upon the historical stage as a liberal institution based on consent.
VII. RENTING PEOPLE: LITMUS TEST FOR LIBERAL-CONTRACTARIAN THEORIES OF JUSTICE
Suppose a philosopher lived his or her whole life in a society with the economy based on some people owning other people, and where the ownership was based on a contractual relationship. Suppose the philosopher wrote extensively about justice but never raised the possibility that there might be something inherently unjust and wrong in a contractual rela-51 Many modern feminist thinkers understand well the fiction and fraud involved in the old coverture contract where the husband had all the external legal rights and obligations for the Ôone person in lawÕ. However, with the exception of Carole Pateman and perhaps a few others, there seems to be little recognition of the same type of fiction and fraud involved in the employment contract where the employer takes all the legal ownership of the produced products and carries all the legal liabilities for the de facto jointly responsible activities of the people working in the enterprise. tionship wherein some people owned others. Regardless of what marvelous subtleties there might be in the philosopherÕs theory of justice, one might consider it lacking in a rather fundamental way. It would fail a rather simple litmus test. The failure to even raise the question about the ownership of other people would condemn the theory of justice as a sophisticated apologia-by-omission for the status quo.
My contention is that we are now in exactly this situation, but with Ôrenting other peopleÕ substituted for Ôowning other peopleÕ as the litmus test. Today, any contract resembling a selfsale contract (or an upfront paid) lifetime labor contract would not be recognized as valid by the legal authorities. But the selfrental or employer-employee contract is the basis of the current economic system and is accepted by liberal-contractarian philosophers of justice as a matter of course without comment.
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The application of the inalienability theory to the employment contract does not require any deep technical knowledge of economics or the law. For instance, in the critique of the social contract of subjection by early democratic theory, the key distinction was between a contract to alienate (translatio) the right of self-government to a sovereign and a contract of delegation, trusteeship (concessio), or representation. Did the governor rule in his own name or only as the representative of the governed?
It takes no esoteric knowledge to understand that the employer-employee contract is a contract of alienation, not delegation. The employer is not the representative, trustee, or delegate of the employees. The employer manages in his or her own name and interests, not in the name or interests of those managed:
The manager in industry is not like the Minister in politics: he is not chosen by or responsible to the workers in the industry, but chosen by and responsible to partners and directors or some other autocratic authority. Instead of the manager being the Minister or servant and the men the ultimate masters, the men are the servants and the manager and the external
